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Hedge funds have been the subject of media attention in the United
States ("U.S.") and around the world given the pronounced growth of the
hedge fund sector in recent years and the comparative dearth of regulations
faced by hedge fund managers. The first part of this paper provides an
overview of the potential agency problems associated with managing a
hedge fund and the associated rationales for hedge fund regulation. While
hedge funds are hardly regulated in the U.S., there are nevertheless
jurisdictions outside the U.S. with different and sometimes more onerous
sets of regulatory requirements. Examples of international differences in
hedge fund regulation include minimum capitalization requirements,
restrictions on the location of key service providers and different
permissible distribution channels via private placements, banks, other
regulated or non-regulated financial intermediaries, wrappers, investment
managers and fund distribution companies.
The second part of this paper provides an analysis of hedge fund
strategies in the context of international differences in hedge fund
regulation. Certain fund strategies have been characterized in the law and
finance literature, as well as in popular media and public policy debates, as
being inherently more risky and associated with more pronounced agency
problems. For instance, managed futures, long/short and event driven
strategies might be associated with greater risk and agency problems than
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market neutral equity strategies and various arbitrage strategies. At issue,
therefore, is whether funds engage in forum shopping to select jurisdictions
that potentially offer greater scope for agency problems associated with
hedge fund management.
The data examined offer little or no support for the view that hedge
fund managers pursuing riskier strategies or strategies with potentially
more pronounced agency problems systematically select jurisdictions with
less stringent regulations. For the most part, fund strategies are not
systematically and statistically related to different regulations observed in
different jurisdictions. In fact, to the extent that there is evidence of forum
shopping, it is such that funds pursuing riskier strategies or strategies with
greater potential agency problems select jurisdictions with more stringent
regulations. We may infer from the evidence that forum shopping by fund
managers in relation to fund strategic focus is not consistent with a "race to
the bottom." Rather, hedge fund managers appear to select jurisdictions
that are in funds' investors' interests in order to facilitate capital raising by
the hedge fund.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hedge funds have been the subject of media attention in the U.S. and
around the world given the pronounced growth of the hedge fund sector in
recent years and the comparative dearth of regulations faced by hedge fund
managers. As of date, it is estimated that hedge fund managers manage
more than $2 trillion (in USD) in hedge fund capital worldwide.' This
amount, while not trivial, is small compared to the size of worldwide
mutual fund capital, which is estimated at $24.32 trillion (in USD).2
Mutual fund investors are great in number and are comprised
primarily of retail investors. Securities laws are thus designed to mitigate
excessive risk-taking and other behavior of mutual fund managers that
would be against the interests of retail investors. Hedge fund investors, by
contrast, are usually much more limited in number and are deemed to be
sophisticated investors (institutional and high net worth investors). This
difference in the investor base creates a "gulf," so to speak, between the
mutual fund and hedge fund industry. As a result of differing investor
bases, hedge funds are able to take advantage of various exemptions in the
1. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE REGULATION, TAXATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF
HEDGE FUNDS AROUND THE GLOBE, June 2007, http://www.pwc.com/extweb/
pwcpublications.nsf/docid/5D8AB75A0 I C274B9852572FA0073A6C0/$File/underthe-sp
otlite.pdf.
2. See Worldwide Mutual Fund Assets and Flows, Second Quarter 2007, INVESTMENT
COMPANY INSTITUTE, Nov. 14, 2007, http://www.ici.org/stats/latest
/ww_06_07.html#TopOfPage (last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
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laws and regulations, which were promulgated and implemented by some
of the most sophisticated regulatory authorities in the world. By
compromising on the extent to which their products or funds can be
marketed to the public,3 hedge funds are not prohibited from employing a
variety of investment instruments and strategies, many of which would not
be permitted to other funds such as mutual funds and private equity funds.
Hedge funds, for example, may utilize derivative instruments; they may
also short sell and leverage rather highly to achieve their investment goals.
Commonly observed hedge fund strategies (i.e., the primary mandate of a
hedge fund) include investments in distressed companies, commodity
trading advisors / managed futures, short biased and small / micro
capitalization ("micro cap") focused strategies, and many others that will
be discussed herein. Although hedge funds are able to use a multitude of
investment strategies, many use similar ones. This behavior is termed as
"herding."
4
There are inevitably various agency problems associated with hedge
fund management. While these agency problems will be described in more
detail in Part III of this paper, we would like to briefly outline the extent to
which potential agency problems may arise. First, in a more direct manner,
hedge funds might pursue investment strategies and/or make financial
reports that benefit the hedge fund manager at the expense of their
investors. For example, hedge funds are much more likely to report
marginally positive monthly returns than returns that are marginally
negative, and this type of returns manipulation significantly aids capital
raising efforts of hedge fund managers.' Second, in a more oblique
3. In the U.S. and the U.K. for example, hedge funds can only be distributed by private
placements. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1.
4. See Michael S. Haigh, Naomi E.Boyd & Bahattin Buyuksahin, Herding Among
Large Speculative Traders in Futures Markets (Working Paper Series, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=981752 (concluding that herding does exist among hedge funds and
is similar in magnitude to such behavior in the private equity market).
5. See Nicolas P.B. Bollen & Veronika Krepely Pool, A Screen for Fraudulent Return
Smoothing in the Hedge Fund Industry, (Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt
University, Working Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=686137 (discussing
managerial smoothing to deal with the risk of capital flight) [hereinafter A Screen for
Fraudulent Return Smoothing]; Nicolas P.B. Bollen & Veronika Krepely Pool, Conditional
Return Smoothing in the Hedge Fund Industry, J. Fin. & Quant. Analysis (forthcoming),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-937990 (finding that managers use conditional return
smoothing-reporting gains but delaying reporting losses-as a response to the risk of capital
flight) [hereinafter Conditional Return Smoothing]; Nicolas P.B. Bollen & Veronika
Krepely Pool, Do Hedge Fund Managers Misreport Returns? Evidence from the Pooled
Distribution (Working Paper, Vanderbilt University 2007) (positing that hedge fund
managers do not report losses in order to attract and retain investors, which may explain
why the number of small gains far exceeds the number of small losses in reported hedge
fund returns); see also Douglas Cumming, Hedge Fund Regulation and Misreported
Returns (Feb. 11, 2008) (York University, Working Paper), available at
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manner, hedge funds' investment strategies might be contrary to the
interests of other investors or shareholders in portfolio companies in which
hedge funds invest.6 For example, hedge funds that acquire significant
voting rights in a company may act in ways that bring about financial
benefit solely for the fund (and therefore its investors), at the expense of
the other company's shareholders and possibly more detrimentally at the
expense of the fund investors' aim to promote industry.7 Such active
participation in portfolio companies by hedge funds have been both labeled
in a flattering manner, as hedge fund activism, and in the more critical
manner, as vulture fund activity.8
One concern shared by many regulators around the world is that the
size of the hedge fund industry coupled with potential agency problems,
activist (vulture) investment practices, and herding behavior, exacerbates
financial instability. The hedge fund industry comprises more than $2
trillion (in USD) in capital under management in recent 2007 estimates. 9
Thus, this industry has significant ability to move markets. For example, in
the week of August 6, 2007, hedge funds following long/short equity
strategies experienced massive losses.'° Empirical evidence on this event is
suggestive of significant and growing systematic risk in the hedge fund
industry. "
http://ssm.com/abstract-1029195 (claiming that the likelihood of managers to misreport
returns is affected by differences in hedge fund regulations in different jurisdictions).
6. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1021 (2007) (providing many illuminating examples
of this category of agency problems).
7. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 61(3) BUSINEss LAWYER 1011 (2006)
(suggesting the decoupling of economic interest from voting rights in order to deal with
such possibly detrimental behavior by hedge funds).
8. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 6 (discussing hedge fund activism and its benefits
and criticisms, concluding that such behavior does not warrant regulation).
9. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 2.
10. Amir E. Khandani & Andrew W. Lo, What Happened to the Quants in August
2007?, (Nov. 4, 2007) (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Working Paper) (discussing
the causes and effects of the losses experienced by the quantitative long/ short equity hedge
funds); see also Mila Getmansky, Andrew W. Lo, & Shauna X. Mei, Sifting through the
Wreckage: Lessons from Recent Hedge Fund Liquidations (Nov. 14, 2004) (Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Working Paper) (analyzing the attrition rates of hedge funds across
different investment styles and making recommendations to stabilize the market). For
related media discussions of this period, see The Hedge Fund Quants of August, Oct. 3,
2007, http://www.salon.com/tech/htww/2007/10/03/quants/index.htmil and What Happened
to the Quants in August 2007?, Oct. 2, 2007, http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/
2007/1 0/what-happened-to-quants-in-august-2007.html.
11. Evidence of hedge fund contagion is mixed. For example, little evidence of
contagion is found in the work of Nicole M. Boyson, Christof W. Stahel & Ren& M. Stulz,
Is There Hedge Fund Contagion? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
12090, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-884202. However, Stephen Brown's
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The first part of this paper provides an overview of the potential
agency problems associated with managing a hedge fund and the
corresponding rationales for hedge fund regulation. While hedge funds are
hardly regulated in the U.S., there are nevertheless jurisdictions outside the
U.S. with different and sometimes more onerous sets of regulatory
requirements. Examples of international differences in hedge fund
regulation include minimum capitalization requirements, restrictions on the
location of key service providers, and permissible distribution channels via
private placements, banks, other regulated or non-regulated financial
intermediaries, wrappers, investment managers and fund distribution
companies.
One argument consistently put forth against more onerous regulation
of hedge funds is the threat of hedge funds moving from one jurisdiction to
a less regulated one to avoid such onerous regulatory oversight. Hedge
funds are free to forum shop by registering in many different countries
around the world, subject to meeting the requirements of the particular
jurisdiction. 2 A central issue considered in this paper is therefore whether
hedge funds that are pursuing riskier strategies are in fact selecting
jurisdictions that have less onerous regulation. If hedge funds pursuing
risky investment strategies select jurisdictions with more onerous
regulation, then we may infer that hedge fund managers perceive regulation
to be informative to investors. By registering in jurisdictions with greater
regulatory oversight, managers proactively mitigate potential agency
conflicts associated with fund management, thus enhancing investor
confidence. By gaining the investors' confidence through regulation, the
hedge funds in return aim to raise more capital. On the other hand, if hedge
fund managers pursuing riskier strategies select jurisdictions that have less
onerous regulatory oversight, then we may worry that those international
differences in hedge fund regulation facilitate a race to the bottom where
fund managers' interests are served at the expense of their investors. Last,
if hedge fund strategies do not vary by international differences in
regulation, then we may infer that regulatory differences provide little or no
information to a fund's investors.
The latter part of this paper provides an empirical analysis of hedge
fund strategies in the context of international differences in hedge fund
regulation. The data examined encompass 1845 funds registered in twenty-
comments on this paper at the University of Pennsylvania Weiss Center Conference on
Alternative Investments indicated there is an alternative way to interpret and understand
hedge fund data that is more indicative of contagion. See Stephen Brown, Hedge Fund
Contagion and Liquidity, Presentation at Wharton Impact Conference: A Global
Perspective on Alternative Investments (Apr. 4, 2008) (presentation available at
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/weiss/ConfPresentations/Brown08.pdf).
12. For many countries these requirements are summarized in
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 12-45.
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four countries around the world. The data offer scant support for the view
that hedge fund managers pursuing riskier strategies or strategies with
potentially more pronounced agency problems systematically select
jurisdictions with less stringent regulations. For the most part, fund
strategies are not systematically and statistically related to different
regulations observed in different jurisdictions. 3 In fact, to the extent that
there is evidence of forum shopping, it is for the most part suggestive that
funds pursuing riskier strategies or strategies with greater potential agency
problems select jurisdictions with more stringent regulations.' 4 We may
infer from the evidence that forum shopping by fund managers in relation
to fund strategic focus is not consistent with a race to the bottom, where
funds select jurisdictions with scant regulation such that regulators have
incentives to offer limited regulation. Rather, the data suggest that hedge
funds select heavily regulated jurisdictions that are in the fund investors'
interests in order to facilitate capital raising by the hedge fund. The data
examined, however, only offer imperfect proxies for agency problems
associated with hedge fund management, and it is possible that the
coarseness in the empirical measures do not pick up certain factors. Given
these limitations, we interpret the evidence in light of the broader law and
finance literature on hedge fund regulation and governance.
II. WHAT ARE HEDGE FUNDS?
For the purposes of this paper, we will refer to George Soros's
statement to help us describe a hedge fund: "Hedge funds engage in a
variety of investment activities. They cater to sophisticated investors and
are not subject to the regulations that apply to mutual funds geared toward
the general public. Fund managers are compensated on the basis of
performance rather than as a fixed percentage of assets."' 5 Note that in the
13. This finding is consistent with the evidence on U.S. hedge fund registration
presented in Stephen Brown, William Goetzmann, Bing Liang & Christopher Schwarz,
Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence from Hedge Fund Registration, J.
FrN. (forthcoming 2007).
14. Consistent empirical evidence has been found in other unrelated contexts, such as in
the seminal work on forum shopping in U.S. corporate law by Roberta Romano, Law as a
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985). Forum
shopping has also been considered in the international context, and the evidence tends to be
consistent in that there is not much evidence in support of a race to the bottom. For
instance, an analysis of forum shopping in Canadian corporate law is provided in Douglas
Cumming and Jeffrey Macintosh, The Role of Interjurisdictional Competition in Shaping
Canadian Corporate Law, 20 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 141 (2000). Forum shopping for
Canadian securities laws is discussed in Ccile Carpentier and Jean-Marc Suret, The
Canadian and American Financial Systems: Competition and Regulation, 29 CANADIAN
PUBLIC POLICY 431 (2003).
15. GEORGE SOROS, OPEN SOCIETY: REFORMING GLOBAL CAPITALISM 32 (PublicAffairs
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U.S. and the United Kingdom ("U.K."), the regulatory authorities have yet
to promulgate a legal definition of "hedge fund."' 6 Other jurisdictions have
decided to take into account the rapidly evolving structure of so-called
hedge funds and their rather innovative investment strategies, thereby
specifying such funds as "Sophisticated Alternative Investment Vehicles,"'"
"Highly Leveraged Institutions,"' 18 and "Leveraged Investment Funds."' 9
As various highly competent regulatory bodies have been unable to define
the term "hedge fund," we will not attempt to do so in this paper.
Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, when reference is made to the
term "hedge fund," we believe the description provided by Mr. Soros will
suffice.
The implementation of hedge fund investment strategies is facilitated
by various external (and increasingly internal) service providers, as
depicted in Figure 1. The hedge fund managers, rather obviously, manage
the fund and determine its investment strategies. They may have other
investment and professional advisors assisting them, such as lawyers,
accountants, consultants, and tax and audit specialists. If the manager is a
large enough organization, such assistance may be obtained internally. If
such an organization is successful, they may be able to manage a few
funds. Administrators also assist the fund managers in providing fund
administrative and accounting services, including record keeping,
independent valuation of investments, and meeting disclosure
requirements. Similarly, the registrar or transfer agent may assist the
manager in processing subscriptions and redemptions and in maintaining
the register of shareholders. Sometimes, depending on the structure of the
fund and the manager, these duties may be carried out internally by the
fund manager. The actual financing arrangements and execution of
investments are carried out by prime brokers which can be either securities
firms or banks. Occasionally, the prime brokers decide to set up their own
fund, and they therefore also become hedge fund managers. There is, of
course, another service provider-the custodian that has custody over the
fund assets. Again, this duty may sometimes be carried out internally by
the prime broker.
2000). For a list of definitions of hedge funds, see David A. Vaughan, Selected Definitions
of "Hedge Fund, " Comments for the U.S. SEC Roundtable on Hedge Funds (May 14-15,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-vaughn.htm.
16. See Tomas Garbaravicius & Frank Dierick, Hedge Funds and Their Implications for
Financial Stability 6 (Eur. Cent. Bank Occasional Paper Series, Paper No. 34, 2005) (noting
that there is "no legal or even generally accepted definition of a hedge fund").
17. As specified by the European Parliament. Id. at 8.
18. As specified by The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Id.
19. As specified by The Multidisciplinary Working Group on Enhanced Disclosure. Id.
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Figure 1. Typical Parties Appointed to Operate a Hedge Fund °
The hedge fund industry is rather similar to other forms of financial
intermediation, such as that carried out by mutual fund managers or private
equity managers. Of course, we are not discounting the rather significant
differences among these three types of financial intermediaries, and in fact
we will very briefly set out the most obvious differences. Mutual funds,
hedge funds, and private equity funds differ in many ways, including, but
not limited to, their investor base, regulatory oversight, transparency,
liquidity, pricing strategies, leverage, and fees.
A. Investor Base
Generally speaking, mutual funds, hedge funds, and private equity
funds can be categorized as public investment companies or pooled
investment vehicles.21 What inevitably exempts hedge funds and private
equity funds from the legal and regulatory requirements and ensuing
oversight of public investment companies or pooled investment vehicles
are the characteristics of their typical investors. Unlike mutual funds,
20. Administrator: record and bookkeeping and independently verify asset value of the
fund. Registrar / Transfer Agent: process subscriptions and redemptions and maintain
registrar of shareholders. Custodian: safe-keeping of assets. Prime Broker: provides
access to stock and loan financing, as well as a host of value-added services.
2 1. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1.
,w-Qa-Cust
""ql
x,
FUN
HEDGE FUND FORUM SHOPPING
hedge funds and private equity funds limit the number of investors as
required by the relevant regulatory authorities. For example, in the U.S.,
hedge funds utilize the exemptions provided pursuant to Section 3(c)(1) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940 and do not exceed ninety nine
investors in order to avoid regulatory oversight.22 Hedge fund investors are
also mainly comprised of institutional investors and high net worth or
wealthy individuals. Taking the U.S. example again, to take advantage of
the exemption under the same Act, hedge funds likely would not allow
those with assets below five million U.S. dollars access to their services.23
B. Regulatory oversight
Due to their accessibility to the general public or retail investors,
mutual funds are subject to rather strict legal and regulatory oversight. In
the U.S., for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission requires
mutual fund managers to be registered.24 Additionally, they are also
subject to various regulations under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
the Securities Act of 1933, the Investment Company Act of 1934, and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1933. Hedge funds and private equity funds
are not as strictly regulated since they are enabled by their structure and
investment strategies to meet the relevant exemption requirements of the
laws and regulations that could otherwise limit their operational freedom.
They essentially avoid regulation by following the letter of the law.
C. Transparency, liquidity, valuation and pricing
Mutual funds, as a result of their investor base and ensuing regulatory
oversight, have to meet stringent disclosure requirements, are obliged to
implement established valuation principles, and have to price their
portfolios on a daily basis. Mutual funds are also the most liquid of the
three funds. In contrast, hedge funds and private equity funds are
extremely opaque with regards to the reporting of their operations and the
22. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV
2004).
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7). For a discussion of hedge fund investor protection in
the U.S., refer to William H. Donaldson, Testimony Concerning Investor Protection
Implications of Hedge Funds by Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Apr. 10, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/041003tswhd.htm [hereinafter Hearings].
24. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(f) and (g) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)
(outlining registration requirements); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A) (listing the Investment
Company Act of 1940 registration requirements); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (listing the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 reporting obligations); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b) (listing the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 registration requirements).
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valuation of their portfolios. Such is the case for private equity funds that,
as a result of mandatory disclosure of private equity fund performance data
such as internal rates of return ("IRR") by public institutional investors
investing in public equity funds, led to the decision by some funds to
exclude public institutional investors.25 With regard to liquidity, hedge
funds are more liquid than private equity funds since private equity funds
require their investors to commit their capital for up to ten years while
hedge funds at most have lock-up periods of up to twenty five months.
D. Strategies and Leverage
Of the three types of funds, the hedge fund is the most autonomous in
its ability to implement its rather innovative investment strategies. Usually
mutual funds are to a certain extent constrained legally in their asset
choices and have to disclose the anticipated allocations in such asset classes
to their investors. Private equity funds are equally constrained by contract,
since they are required at the outset to specify the maximum amount of
capital to be invested in any one company and also to specify the industry
and stages of development of investee companies. Conversely, hedge
funds are able to use a variety of investment strategies that ironically have
far less to do with hedging. These strategies include the use of facilities not
normally accessible to mutual funds and private equity funds such as short-
selling and derivatives. We will elaborate on the strategies utilized by
hedge funds in Part V.
Another rather significant difference is that both mutual funds and
private equity funds are constrained in their ability to leverage. These
constraints are usually legal and regulatory in form for mutual funds and
are contractual for private equity funds. In contrast, hedge funds are
"leveraging" creatures in that they sell securities short and buy securities on
leverage.26 They are, however, not leveraged in the more traditional sense
of taking on more debt capital. They leverage themselves by the innovative
use of derivative instruments, the use of margin financing, and short
selling.
25. See Nat'l Venture Capital Association, Latest FOIA Developments-San Jose
Mercury News vs. CALPERS (Nov. 22, 2002), http://www.nvca.org/nvcal 1 22_02b.html
(discussing San Jose Mercury News v. California Public Employees' Retirement Systems
decided by California Supreme Court on Nov. 6, 2002); see also Susan Chaplinksy & Susan
E. Perry, CalPERS vs. Mercury News: Disclosure Comes to Private Equity
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=567525 (discussing the effect of
CaIPERS v. Mercury News on the private equity market).
26. See Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management,
Report of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, Report 3097, 2, (Apr. 15,
1999), where it is also stated that "While this activity is not unique to hedge funds, hedge
funds often use leverage aggressively."
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E. Fees and proprietary investment
Mutual funds are usually constrained in their ability to arbitrarily
impose fees or sales charges, and they are more often than not required to
disclose their fees to their potential investors. In contrast, hedge fund and
private equity fund managers impose a management fee based on the size
of the fund managed (usually 2.5% for private equity funds and 1.5% for
hedge funds) and a performance fee, which is usually 20% of the profits."7
Private equity fund managers and hedge fund managers are both usually
required to put their money where their mouths are, or pay to play. This is
not the case for mutual fund managers. Private equity fund managers
however only really invest a minimal amount in the fund partnership to
meet the requirements of general partnership, and they are for the most part
restricted from co-investing in investee companies. Hedge fund managers
in contrast are not restricted in the amount of proprietary capital that they
may invest in the hedge funds they manage.
While there are very significant differences among the three funds,
what is significantly similar among them are that all three types of fund
managers owe their funds and fund investors a fiduciary duty to act in the
best interest of the fund and fund investors. The duties of good faith, fair
dealing, loyalty, and care have to be upheld by all hedge fund managers as
well as their counterparts. They are also prohibited from engaging in
fraudulent activities as are other financial intermediaries. As with any form
of financial intermediation, however, there will inevitably be conflicts of
interest or agency problems. Such agency problems are exacerbated by the
characteristics of the hedge fund which we listed earlier in this part. In the
next part we will list the potential agency problems encountered in hedge
fund management, how they are connected to the characteristics of hedge
funds, and how regulatory measures have sought to mitigate such
problems.
III. AGENCY PROBLEMS IN HEDGE FUND MANAGEMENT
The debate with regard to the regulation of hedge funds probably
started as a result of the Long Term Capital Management debacle in 1998,
27. For data on venture capital and private equity funds, see Douglas J. Cumming &
Sofia A. Johan, Is it the Law or the Lawyers? Investment Covenants around the World, 12
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 535 (2006). See also Douglas J. Cumming & Sofia A.
Johan, Legality and Fund Manager Compensation (York University Schulich School of
Business, Working Paper, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=765004. For hedge fund manager compensation data, see Douglas Cumming,
A Law and Finance Analysis of Hedge Funds (York University Schulich School of
Business, Working Paper, 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=946298.
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and will continue as capital increasingly floods into the industry. The risks
such funds pose to the stability of the financial industry as a whole are
becoming more apparent. While being demonized in the popular media, it
would however be incorrect to say that hedge funds are wholly unregulated
rogue entities.28  Across the globe, the activities of hedge funds are
constrained to a certain extent by various laws and regulations which aim
to protect investors and the stability of the financial market or economy
within a given jurisdiction. However, even in the U.S. and the U.K., which
are deemed to be the strictest regulatory regimes, such laws and regulations
have been found to be insufficient in view of the potential systemic damage
as a result of the growth and evolution of the industry, and there is a call by
policy makers for this "regulatory-light" environment to be reviewed.2 9
The agency problems that may arise in a hedge fund manager and
client relationship comprise conflicts of interest between any of the parties
involved in the management of the hedge fund. As we mentioned earlier in
Part I, depending on the structure, size, and jurisdictional base of the hedge
fund, the duties carried out by the manager, its advisors, administrator,
registrar or transfer agent, prime broker and custodian may either be carried
out partly or wholly internally, or partly or wholly outsourced. There will,
therefore, be a rather endless list of potential conflicts of interest that may
arise between the parties depending on the nature and extent of their
relationship. We will for the purposes of this paper limit our discussion of
conflicts to those that more common and readily recognizable among the
parties and regulatory bodies, and how they relate to the characteristics
unique to hedge funds. We will also provide a brief description of the
nature of the conflict, whether they are business oriented in nature, related
to the marketing process, or a legal conflict. These types of conflicts may
also overlap. For example, the business conflict of the manager using his
proprietary assets to allocate securities to his own account before
implementing his investment strategy may be a business conflict as well as
a legal conflict of insider trading and a breach of fiduciary duty.
A. Potential conflicts arising from investor base
Hedge funds comprise institutional investors, endowments, and high
net worth individuals. While the argument against the regulation of hedge
28. This perception of hedge funds being unregulated entities may have been
exacerbated by the ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in Goldstein v. SEC, on June 23, 2006. The court overturned SEC Rule 203(b)(3)-2 of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, commonly known as the Hedge Fund Rule, that required
hedge fund managers to register with the SEC no later than February 1, 2006 based on the
number of investors in their funds, not the number of funds they manage. See Goldstein v.
SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
29. See Hearings, supra note 23.
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funds may center around the fact that its investors are sophisticated
investors, it can be argued that, of the different types of investors, the least
sophisticated may be the high net worth individual. The threshold to be
deemed as a high net worth individual and therefore a sophisticated
investor, may range from the holding of assets of $1 million to $5 million
(in USD) and above.3° However, does it make sense that if a person was to
win $5 million (in USD) in a lottery tomorrow, that person would
immediately become as sophisticated an investor as an insurance company?
We would not think so and neither would a hedge fund manager. The
hedge fund manager is aware that the level of due diligence carried out
prior to investment by a high net worth investor will differ from that of an
insurance company. The high net worth individual may neither have the
technical capabilities nor want to incur the added expense of hiring experts
to carry out the due diligence. 3' The institutional investor, however, has a
fiduciary duty to its own clients and will therefore exercise a thorough due
diligence. The hedge fund manager may therefore be incentivized to
provide more information during the marketing exercise to different types
of investors. The hedge fund manager also aims to not only attract new
investors to a fund, but also retain existing investors as potential investors
in other hedge funds he will inevitably establish. The potential for conflicts
to arise as a result of his preference to retain specific investors over others
may result in preferential disclosure in different marketing efforts,
preferential investment, and preferential redemption terms among others.
Such agency problems may give rise to a legal conflict with regard to
allocation issues, breach of fiduciary duty, and disclosure issues. 32 A
potential business conflict is the high net worth individual being given less
30. Beat D. Speck & Joseph Tanega, Private equity placements: Comparing the laws
in Switzerland, the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States: Part II, 21
J. INT'L BANKING L. AND REG. 252, 255 (2006).
31. The SEC recommends that potential hedge fund investors carry out the necessary
due diligence to verify the qualifications and track record (such as disciplinary record) of the
prospective financial intermediary. Such due diligence may be carried out by reviewing the
prospective agent's Form ADV (if he is registered) through a search at the Investment
Adviser Public Disclosure Website. SEC, Investment Advisor Public Disclosure,
http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/Content/Search/iapdOrgSearch.aspx (last visited
March 7, 2008). Alternatives include the SEC's Public Reference Room or the state
securities regulator, where the adviser's principal place of business is located (for advisers
with less than $25 million (in USD) in assets under management). Investors are also advised
to check the NASD's FinRaBrokerCheck database. FINRA, Investor Protection,
http://www.finra.org/Investorlnformation/InvestorProtection/index.htm (last visited March
7, 2008). A final source may be checking the listings of any other relevant state securities
regulator for any information they may have.
32. See A Screen for Fraudulent Return Smoothing, supra note 5, at 36 (finding that
among fifty-three SEC litigation cases, fraudulent offerings where the fund is advertised to
new investors comprises five of the fifty-three cases (or ten of eighty offenses allowing for
more than one offense per case)).
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favorable investment terms in the fund than other more sophisticated
investors.
B. Potential conflicts arising from fees and proprietary investment by
hedge fund managers
The fee structure for hedge fund managers may also bring about
potential agency problems as the hedge fund manager may be incentivized
to take unnecessary risks. The manager essentially has a 20% share of
unlimited upside potential, but will not similarly share in any losses.
3 3
Unlike the investor, unless he invests his own proprietary capital, the
manager in essence has an option-like compensation structure. That said,
as he has total control over the investment strategies, he may be able to
protect his share of the fund from the additional risks that he is placing on
the rest of the fund. This total control over the investment of the fund also
follows through to the fees to be paid to support service providers.
As mentioned above, some successful hedge fund managers manage a
few funds, sometimes concurrently. There are also instances where prime
broker banks that already manage a few mutual funds establish their own
hedge funds. What is increasingly the case is that other financial
intermediaries, such as mutual fund managers and private equity fund
managers, are joining the fray, so to speak, and establishing hedge funds
alongside other types of funds. This is also the case for the support service
providers such as prime brokers that may not have their own hedge funds to
manage, but provide services to both hedge funds and mutual funds. In
these situations where one institution wears two hats or where one party
has to act in the interests of various side-by-side clients, there is the
potential for agency problems to arise. This is especially the case where
the level of fees acquired from different clients, or different types of
clients, differs in that some funds or managers are willing to pay higher
transaction fees for "special" services. Some managers and prime brokers
therefore may provide additional information regarding an investment,
carry out preferential allocations, confer liquidity preferences, or other
preferential treatments in favor of a specific hedge fund over others either
due to higher fees paid or the level of proprietary investment made in that
specific fund. Specific hedge funds may also be favored over other mutual
funds again due to the higher fees or the institution's dependency on the
execution business of the hedge fund. It has been indicated that prime
brokers are increasingly becoming dependent on the income stream
garnered from hedge funds to the point of such income comprising an
33. Cumming, supra note 27.
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eighth of total revenue in one case.3" Such agency problems may give rise
to a legal conflict with regard to allocation issues, breach of fiduciary duty,
disclosure issues and insider trading. A potential business conflict is the
competition of allocations and investment opportunities between an
institution (or manager) on a proprietary basis and the hedge fund.
C. Potential conflicts arising from lack of regulatory oversight
As mentioned above, in many jurisdictions, if not all, hedge funds are
not as strictly regulated as they are enabled by their structure and
investment strategies to meet the relevant requirements to be exempt from
the laws and regulations that could limit their operational freedom. This
ability to operate freely may give rise to a gamut of potential agency
problems. It is said that "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power
corrupts absolutely."35
Agency problems in hedge fund management often take a more basic
form of simple fraud. In a recent study of hedge fund litigation cases, it is
noteworthy that Professors Bollen and Pool found that the most common
type of offense involved misappropriation, whereby a fund manager diverts
investor capital for personal expenses.36
While it is true that regulatory oversight may not totally remove
agency problems, proper regulation may still mitigate the potential for them
to arise as proper rules of behavior by all parties involved and procedures
to be adhered to are to be abided at the threat of civil or criminal penalties.
What is interesting to note is that just as hedge funds have utilized the letter
of the law to be exempted from regulatory oversight, they are also using the
law to protect themselves in the event they themselves or any of their
support service providers become "corrupted absolutely." In some private
placement memoranda, the instrument with which they market their fund to
sophisticated investors, they include a section specifically addressing a
range of potential conflicts of interest or activities that could be construed
as such. These include, but are not limited to, proprietary trading,
managing side-by-side funds, and managing competing funds. With this
disclosure, investors are given notice and will have to agree that the
34. See Garbaravicius & Dieick, supra note 16, at 36.
35. See E.D. HIRSCH, JR., JOSEPH F. KETT, & JAMES TREFIL, THE NEW DICTIONARY OF
CULTURAL LITERACY 324 (3d ed., 2002) (quoting Lord Acton in a letter to Bishop Mandell
Creighton in 1887).
36. Professor Bollen and Pool investigated fifty SEC hedge fund litigation cases, and
found that misappropriation was an offense in twenty-one of the fifty three cases. See A
Screen for Fraudulent Return Smoothing, supra note 5. Similarly, Ponzi schemes-where
abnormally high short-term returns are offered in order to entice new investors, which can
only be sustained by a continued increase in the flow of capital from new investors-
comprised six of the fifty-three cases. See id.
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disclosed potential activities will not be actionable, thereby protecting the
fund and the manager from potential lawsuits or disciplinary measures.
The lack of regulatory oversight may provide the hedge fund manager and
other support service providers with the necessary latitude to undertake
behavior that may be improper, if not illegal, because of the lack of
regulation. On the other hand, this perception of the hedge funds as wholly
unregulated rogue financial intermediaries may be detrimental to the
participants and therefore the lack of formal regulation may be ameliorated
by self-regulating actions.3 7
D. Potential conflicts arising from lack of transparency, liquidity,
independent valuation and pricing
Hedge funds are known for their opaqueness, illiquidity, highly
subjective valuation methods, and inability (or rather unwillingness) to
price themselves. If the investors in hedge funds find it difficult to obtain a
full picture of the investment, they will find it almost impossible to
determine the full extent of the related party transactions among the
external support service providers and the fund itself. It is not difficult to
see how agency problems may arise in this case. Also, note that even if
most of the support services are provided internally, they will be provided
by different departments or agents and therefore there is still the potential
for conflicts of interest to arise. Take for example the simple valuation of
investments carried out by the hedge fund. This is not usually carried out
independently by an external agent, and this subjective valuation process
gives rise to the potential for managers to over-value certain investments,
under-value losses, and generally sugarcoat fund performance.38  Even
37. The Hedge Fund Working Group, led by Sir Andrew Large, former Bank of
England deputy governor, released best practice standards that encourage full disclosure of
investment risk, independent valuation of investment portfolios and transparency over fees,
investment risks and relationships with lenders and prime brokers. Fourteen large hedge
fund managers including Lansdowne Partners, RAB Capital, Brevan Howard, Man Group,
Och Ziff and Cheyne Capital have voluntarily agreed to introduce the standards. See David
Litterick, Hedge Fund Managers Outline Transparency Code, THE TELEGRAPH, Jan. 23,
2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/
2008/01/23/cnhedge123.xml. Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank
and the German authorities have been pushing for some time for the introduction of a
voluntary code of conduct for hedge funds. See Ralph Atkins & Lionel Barber, Trichet Sees
More Support for Hedge Fund Code, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 18, 2007, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/fl858e0a-04db- 11 dc-80ed-000b5df10621 .html.
38. In fifty-three hedge fund fraud cases litigated by the U.S. SEC, twenty-one involved
misappropriation where a fund manager diverted investor capital for personal expenses and
fifteen involved misrepresentation of returns where a fund manager overstated or otherwise
distorted fund asset values. See A Screen for Fraudulent Return Smoothing, supra note 5;
see also Susan Ferris Wyderko, Testimony Concerning Hedge Funds by the Director, Office
of Investor Education and Assistance, U.S. SEC Before the Subcommittee on Securities and
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where such valuation is carried out independently, the valuer is essentially
carrying out the instructions of its client and the hedge fund manager.
Valuations and disclosures are made on the basis of information, which is
in turn disclosed to him by the hedge fund manager. Conflicts may also
arise when all support services are provided internally as different business
units within an institution do not act in alignment and against the interest of
the fund the institution is managing. For example, some banks have units
which carry out mergers and acquisitions advisory, underwriting activities
and distressed companies advisory. These activities may have an effect on
the companies in which a hedge fund unit of the bank is investing.39
Conversely, where all business units do act in concert, conflicts may also
arise. For example, where a custodian acts in concert with the manager and
against the interest of the fund, there is a potential for the manager to
misuse the fund capital at the expense of fund investors. Such agency
problems may give rise to a legal conflict with regard to disclosure issues,
breach of fiduciary duty, insider trading or improper related party
transactions, and allocation issues. A potential business conflict is the
provision of such fee generating services such as M&A advisory,
underwriting activities and advising distressed companies by a unit of the
bank at the expense of the investments made in such companies by the
hedge fund unit of the same bank.
E. Potential conflicts arising from strategies and leverage
Hedge funds, in contrast to mutual funds or private equity funds, are
able to use a variety of investment strategies that ironically have far less to
do with hedging. These strategies include the use of facilities not normally
accessible to mutual funds and private equity funds, which are short-selling
and derivatives. We will elaborate on the strategies utilized by hedge funds
in Part V. Contrary to popular belief, hedge funds no longer primarily
hedge, nor do they utilize uniform investment strategies or investment
instruments. It is therefore said that, "The complexity of the strategies
employed by hedge funds as they aim for absolute returns adds to the
barrier of understanding regarding the specific risk posed by the
Investment of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs (May 16,
2006) ("Unlike a mutual fund, hedge fund valuation practices are not overseen by an
independent board of directors. A number of the Commission's enforcement cases against
hedge fund advisers involve the adviser's valuation of fund assets in order to hide losses or
to artificially boost performance.").
39. In mid-2005, the U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA) expressed concern over
institutionalization of insider trading affecting almost a third of mergers and acquisitions
where hedge funds are involved not only as part of their strategies of risk/merger arbitrage
but also simply as traders.
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investments., 40 Fund managers may even pursue offsetting strategies that
are disguised in marketing materials. For example, a fund manager might
invest long in one index and short the same index within the same fund or
with two different funds.41  Such a fund manager would collect
management fees on both funds and performance fees on one of the two
funds, at the expense of the investors. Further, hedge fund managers might
"style drift" and invest in a strategy that is different from their strategy that
was stated to their investors.42
Different hedge fund strategies may pose conflicts of interest with the
other shareholders or debtholders in the companies in which the fund
invests. 43 For example, for micro cap investments, while the hedge fund
investors are very large, the investee companies themselves are very small
and illiquid, and it is relatively easy to manipulate trading activity and
returns among such investments. As another example, hedge funds can
innovatively take advantage of derivatives instruments, margin financing,
and short selling to make both debt and equity investments in financially
distressed companies, and thereby profit by investing in ways that are
counter to the interests of the company's other shareholders and/or debt
holders. Further, hedge funds may engage in "empty voting" when they
acquire voting rights that are divergent from their ownership interests, and
thereby vote in a way that is counter to the interests of the other
shareholders and solely at a financial gain to the fund.44 More generally, it
is possible that hedge fund interests are much more short term than that of
the other shareholders thereby leading to investment strategies and voting
decisions by the hedge fund that are to the detriment of their investee
companies and such companies' other shareholders.45 Such practices,
however, have not been prevalent or severe enough for legal analysts to
conclude that a case for legal intervention has been made.46
Hedge fund investment horizons also tend to be more short term than
banks. For instance, hedge funds may pursue strategies in which they
trigger bankruptcy in a financially distressed company and then buy the
40. Remarks before the SIA Hedge Funds & Alternative Investments Conference by
Commissioner Roel C. Campos, U.S. SEC (June 14, 2006).
41. This example was discussed by Larry Harris in 2006 at the DeGroote Market
Microstructure Conference in Toronto (Nov. 2006).
42. Professor Bollen and Pool found that misrepresenting strategy accounted for one of
53 SEC hedge fund litigation cases (and allowing for more than one offence per case,
misrepresenting strategy involved 4 of 80 offences). See A Screen for Fraudulent Return
Smoothing, supra note 5. This suggests style drift is not that pronounced or alternatively, it
suggests that it is not so serious as to lead to litigation.
43. Kahan & Rock, supra note 6.
44. Hu & Black, supra note 7.
45. Kahan & Rock, supra note 6.
46. Id.
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debt of the company in the secondary loan market. Banks, for instance,
face regulations that impose a "Chinese Wall" to separate commercial and
investment banking activities within the institution, and these restrictions
were strengthened by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 4' Hedge funds face
a comparative dearth of oversight and are nevertheless able to lend and
hold equity in the same company.
Below, in Part V of this paper we consider alternative fund strategies
in more detail. Specifically, we address the question of whether differences
in hedge fund strategies are associated with hedge fund forum shopping.
That is, because hedge funds may register in different jurisdictions, it is
possible that funds pursuing strategies with more pronounced agency costs
select jurisdictions with comparatively less regulatory oversight. Before
we turn to that question, we first explain international differences in hedge
fund regulation in Part IV.
IV. INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN HEDGE FUND REGULATION
Given the significant scope of potential agency problems, regulators in
many countries around the world are calling for additional hedge fund
regulation. For example, it is noteworthy that on January 22, 2008,
fourteen of the largest hedge funds in the U.K. agreed to greater voluntary
disclosure standards. 48 The disclosure standards are designed to give rise to
more information about investment strategies, risks and asset valuation. It
has been conjectured by media commentators that the hedge fund industry
agreed to the voluntary standards in order to mitigate the possibility of
more onerous regulatory standards being imposed in the future.49 This
possibility for more onerous regulation may still be rather far off in the
horizon as even in the U.S., hedge funds still enjoy comparatively minimal
regulation. U.S. hedge funds organize themselves as limited partnerships,
market themselves by private placements to sophisticated institutional
investors and high net worth individuals, and limit their investor number to
meet exemption requirements, such as those enabling them to avoid
disclosure laws of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933.'o In 2006, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman, Christopher Cox,
expressly indicated that hedge funds should not remain unregulated.5
47. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
48. James Mackintosh, Hedge Funds Agree Greater Disclosure, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan.
22, 2008, at 18.
49. Id.
50. In a private placement there must not be more than thirty-five "non-accredited"
investors, where a non-accredited investor is someone with more than $1 million (in USD)
in wealth or earned more than $200,000 (in USD) in the previous two years. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a) (defining "non-accredited" investor).
51. Hearings, supra note 23 (testimony of Chairman Cox). See also Harvey J.
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Most hedge funds, however, remain largely unregulated irrespective of
SEC initiatives. 2
In view of the growing call towards increasing hedge fund regulation
in certain countries, it is worthwhile to examine the international
experience with hedge fund regulation. It was argued in Goldstein v. SEC
and elsewhere that hedge funds should not face greater regulations in the
U.S. since many fund managers would simply relocate abroad or "forum
shop to the bottom." 5
International differences in hedge fund regulation are outlined in
Table 1. For the purposes of this paper, we will concentrate on differences
in hedge fund regulation across countries that fall within three primary
categories: (1) minimum capital to operate as a hedge fund, (2) permissible
marketing channels, and (3) restrictions on the location of key service
providers. 4 Specific details on these differences across countries are
reviewed in detail in the PriceWaterhouseCoopers report55 ("PWC") and
are briefly summarized below.
Goldschmid, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Should Hedge Funds be Regulated? (Nov. 17,
2004) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spchl 111704hjg.htm. For industry
perspectives on hedge fund regulation, see, e.g., HedgeCo.net, Hedge Funds Regulation:
Demand for Increase in Hedge Fund Regulations due to Increasing Fraud Cases,
http://www.hedgeco.net/hedge-fund-regulations.htm (last visited May 10, 2008) and Hedge
Fund Regulation.com, Hedge Fund Regulation, http://www.hedgefundregulation.com/ (last
visited May 10, 2008).
52. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 875. Regardless, empirical evidence is consistent with the
view that the information produced by the registration of hedge funds did not significantly
increase information available to investors. See Brown et al., supra note 13 (explaining the
effect disclosure requirements had on hedge funds).
53. 451 F.3d at 883.
54. See supra Part II (Figure 1) for a discussion of key services providers.
55. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1 (illustrating differences in hedge
fund regulation and taxation among countries). The majority of countries and years are
available in PWC report. For countries/years not available, we obtained information about
regulation from the hedge funds in a survey sent to selected funds. It is noteworthy that the
broad regulatory categories we use have been stable over time (distribution channels, size
and restrictions on location are rarely modified restrictions), but there have been changes to
other areas, particularly taxation.
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Table I. Regulation of and Channels for Distribution of Hedge Funds by Country
This table summarizes by country the regulation of hedge funds across twenty-four
countries, including the minimum capital requirements, permissible marketing channels and
whether there exists restrictions on the location of key service providers (Figure 1).
Sources: PriceWaterhouseCoopers, The Regulation, Taxation and Distribution of Hedge
Funds in Europe: Changes and Challenges (June 2006), PriceWaterhouseCoopers Under
the spotlight: The Regulation, Taxation and Distribution of Hedge Funds around the
Globe. London: PriceWaterhouseCoopers (June 2007), and authors' surveys of hedge
funds.
Proxy for
minimum
# Funds in # Funds capital Restrictions on
Country Combined in requirement to location of key
CISDM HFN CISDM operate as service providers?
Dataset Dataset hedge fund
manager
(2005 $ USD)
Australia 2 1 $0 0
Austria 2 1 $6,750,000 0
Bahamas 19 18 $25,000 1
Bermuda 76 70 $0 1
Brazil 6 4 $362,000 1
British Virgin 97 97 $500,000
Islands
Canada 20 13 $0 0
Cayman Islands 372 371 $500,000
Channel Islands 4 0 $44,077 0
China 1 0 $0 1
France 8 7 $168,750 0
Hong Kong 1 0 $2,275,000 0
Ireland 24 20 $67,500 1
Isle of Man 1 1 $142,500 1
Japan 2 0 $0 0
Luxembourg 9 9 $168,750 0
Mauritius 2 2 $0 1
Netherlands 1 0 $303,750 1
Netherland 6 6 $0
Antilles
New Zealand 1 1 $0 0
Switzer-land 2 0 $4,300,000 1
U.K. 20 0 $67,500 0
U.S. 1455 503 $0 0
U.S. Virgin Islands 6 0 $500,000
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Table I (Continued). Regulation of and Channels for Distribution of Hedge Funds by Country
Main Marketing Channels
Fund Other Non- Total 
# of
Country Banks distrib. Wrap- Private Investment regul. fin. regul. fin. 
marke-
co.'s perts placements managers services inter- ting chan-
instit.'s med.'s nels
Austra-
lia
Austria
Baha-
mas
Bermu-
da
Brazil
British
Virgin
Islands
Canada
Cayman
Islands
Channel
Islands
China
France
Hong
Kong
Ireland
Isle of
Man
Japan
Luxem-
bourg
Mauri-
tius
Nether-
lands
Nether-
land
Antilles
New
Zealand
Switzer-
land
U.K.
U.S.
U.S.
Virgin
Islands
I
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Some jurisdictions require hedge funds to maintain minimum
capitalization in order to continue operating. One rationale is that greater
minimum capitalization facilitates financial stability by mitigating the risk
of fund failure. An additional rationale for minimum capitalization
requirements is that lower quality and less reputable fund managers will
have difficulty establishing funds in jurisdictions with higher minimum
capitalization requirements. In view of the sophisticated investor base, it is
perceived that the funds that are able to attract enough investors and pass
their due diligence exercises to raise the minimum amount of capital
required should be allowed to operate. Also, as the fees charged by the
hedge fund managers are dependent on the capital raised, there needs to be
sufficient capital to meet overhead costs of managing a fund and meeting
relevant administrative, disclosure and regulatory requirements. Minimum
capitalization also indirectly ensures that hedge funds limit their investors
to high net worth individuals and institutional investors. They are
restricted in the number of investors they may have, therefore each investor
has to invest a rather substantial sum. The larger the amount an investor
invests, the better his bargaining power with regards to seeking more
transparency from the hedge fund, obtaining better liquidity terms and
ensuring that proper valuation and pricing methods are used. Minimum
capitalization amounts indicated in Table 1 are however comparatively
small relative to potential losses.5 6 Austria has the greatest minimum
capitalization requirement at $6.75 million (in USD) among the twenty-
four countries enumerated in Table 1. Many jurisdictions such as
Bermuda, Canada, New Zealand and the U.S. currently have no minimum
capitalization requirements.
Different countries also have different permissible distribution
channels. In the hedge fund industry, capital is most often sought through
private placements. Jurisdictions limit the hedge funds' distribution
channels to mainly private placements as that channel precludes the hedge
funds from direct access to retail investors and thereby limits potential
conflicts of interests that might arise with unsophisticated retail based
investors.57 In view of their aim to limit their investor base to sophisticated
institutional and high net worth individuals, this limitation on hedge funds'
distribution channels cannot however be said to be overly detrimental. In
56. For some countries, minimum capitalization depends on fund operating costs and
other things specific to the fund, and as such the values indicated in Table 1 are proxies. For
details, see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 46-48 (illustrating minimum
investment amounts among countries).
57. See supra Part IV. Private placements have nevertheless been associated with
exacerbated agency problems associated with managerial entrenchment in different
contexts. See, e.g., Michael Barclay, Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, Private
Placements and Managerial Entrenchment, 13 J. CoRP. FIN. 461 (2006) (providing evidence
on the effect of private placements of large percentage blocks of stock).
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fact, this limitation may enable hedge funds to be less transparent with their
initial disclosures, such as their fee structure and liquidity terms. Their
private placement memoranda (and ensuing negotiations) may be tailored
to meet the requirements of different types of investors, and therefore the
investors may not be playing on a level playing field. Private placements
are permitted in most jurisdictions, except Austria, Luxembourg and
Switzerland (Table 1).
In many countries outside the U.S., there are additional distribution
channels through which funds may gain greater access to a wider range of
investors. For example, twelve of the twenty-four countries in the sample
permit distributions via wrappers. Wrapper products are typically
insurance policies or structured products,58 and some jurisdictions such as
the Isle of Man and South Africa permit wrappers distributions via
insurance companies only.5 9  Legal practitioners have noted potential
conflicts of interest with respect to disclosures in the wrapper, 60 and
generally wrappers are used to overcome regulatory barriers in distributions
to high net worth individuals. 6' While it is possible that retail investors
may take advantage of this potential access to hedge fund via wrapper
products, these products are most probably characterized as higher risk
products within the institutions that create them. As these institutions
themselves are highly regulated and will have more stringent risk
disclosure requirements, it is unlikely that the products would be marketed
to, and included in, an unsophisticated retail investor's portfolio.
Distributions via banks are permitted in every country enumerated in
Table 1 except the Bahamas, France, Isle of Man, Mauritius, Netherlands,
Netherland Antilles, and the U.S. Many (albeit not all) of these
jurisdictions that permit distributions via banks also permit distributions via
other regulated financial services institutions. Sixteen of the twenty-four
jurisdictions permit distributions via investment managers and twelve of
the jurisdictions permit distributions via fund distribution companies.
These additional channels of distribution may be deemed by regulators to
be appropriate in view of the strict regulatory oversight over these
institutions themselves. Also, it is in the interests of the hedge funds
themselves to avoid the inclusion of potentially unsophisticated investors to
ensure the continuity of their ability to operate rather free of regulation.
58. See Stanley Fink, The Distribution of Hedge Funds to Mass Affluent Investors,
ALTERNATIVE INV. MGMT. Ass'N J. (Sep. 2005), available at http://www.aima.org/
uploads/Fink68.pdf (explaining that the two main types of wrapper products are insurance
policies and structured products).
59. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1, at 50-51.
60. See Gerstein, K.S., Hedge Fund Distribution: Regulatory Hot Buttons, Schulte
Roth & Zabel, LLP (2006) (illustrating conflicts of interest with wrappers).
61. See Fink, supra note 58 (explaining the advantages of wrappers to individuals with
a high net worth).
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Therefore, the hedge fund managers will themselves ensure that investment
managers market the product appropriately.
The final type of regulation we address in this paper is the restriction
on the use of key service providers based outside the jurisdiction. Of the
jurisdictions, twelve impose restrictions on the location of key service
providers. For example, the Isle of Man requires local residency for day-
to-day operators for Professional Investor Funds and Experienced Investor
Funds. For Germany, the investment manager and custodian bank are
required to be based in, and regulated by, Germany (Additional details on
the nature of the restrictions of location are provided by
PricewaterhouseCoopers 62). Regulatory authorities most likely view as
sufficient the existing regulatory oversight of key service providers
providing support services to the hedge fund. Even if these services are
carried out internally within an institution, the provision of such services by
the specific department will be regulated by the relevant regulatory body or
authority. Unlike the two previous types of restrictions mentioned earlier,
which are somewhat related to limiting access to hedge funds by
unsophisticated retail investors, this restriction is more in line with ensuring
that the hedge fund utilizes only recognized (thus potentially regulated)
service providers. For example, the higher fees the hedge funds pay may
not be that much of an incentive for service providers to act in concert with
hedge fund managers contrary to the interest of hedge fund investors if
there is a threat of disciplinary action or reputational harm. The
reputational concerns among service providers have led them to ensure that
the hedge funds meet certain transparency, disclosure, liquidity and
valuation method benchmarks. Also, as hedge funds seek to build up their
own reputations for professionalism to seek further capital, they will align
themselves to the more reputable and professional service providers.
Suffice it to say that the international differences in hedge fund
regulation broadly depicted in Table 1 do not capture all of the nuances of
the differences across countries. They do, however, enable broad levels of
comparison that can be used in our empirical analyses of forum shopping,
which is carried out in the next part below.
Based on the data used in the empirical analyses in this paper, the
prevalence of funds registered in each jurisdiction is summarized in Table
1. The data sources are described in Part V.B provided immediately below.
V. HEDGE FUND FORUM SHOPPING
This part considers the issue of whether hedge funds pursuing riskier
strategies select jurisdictions that have less onerous regulation. We look at
62. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 1.
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the average monthly return and standard deviation of returns to determine
the riskiness of each strategy. In Part V.A. we describe hedge fund
strategies and relate different strategies to the extent to which risk and
agency problems are more pronounced. In turn, we also conjecture
hypotheses regarding fund strategies and forum shopping for different
regulation. In Part V.B., we describe the dataset used to test the
hypotheses. Multivariate empirical tests are provided in Part V.C.
Limitations and extensions regarding the tests are acknowledged in Part
V.D. Thereafter concluding remarks follow in Part VI.
A. Hedge Fund Strategies and Forum Shopping
Hedge fund strategies are classified into different investment
strategies. Funds report their primary strategies or investment focus to
hedge fund data vendors such as the Center for International Securities and
Derivatives Markets ("CISDM"), HedgeFund.Net, and TASS. The range
of strategies recorded differs slightly across different data vendors. The
strategies indicated in the HedgeFund.Net and CISDM datasets (which are
described further below in Part V.B) are indicated in Table 2. The range of
strategies recorded in the HedgeFund.Net dataset is slightly broader than
that which is found in CISDM.63
63. The Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets ("CISDM') records
styles for Merger Arbitrage, Equity Long/Short, Relative Value Multi-Strategy, Emerging
Markets, Equity Market Neutral, Multi-Strategy, Convertible Arbitrage, Global Macro,
Fixed Income, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Technology Sector, Event Driven Multi Strategy,
Distressed Securities, Option Arbitrage, Capital Structure Arbitrage, Market Timing, Short
Bias, Equity Long Only, Regulation D, Other Relative Value and Other Strategy.
HedgeFund.Net records these styles, as well as the additional ones indicated in Table 2.
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Table 2. Hedge Fund Strategies
This table defines the fund strategies. Sources: http://www.hedgefund.net/defphp3,
http://www.investopedia.com, and http://www.wikipedia.com. The number of funds in each
strategy and the average monthly return and standard deviation for the period 2003-2005 are also
presented.
Average Average
# of Monthly Standard DefinitionFund Strategy Funds Return Deviation of
(%) Returns (%)
An investment strategy that seeks to
mitigate or avoid market risk in equity
Market 512 1.17 2.90 investments, such that there is minimal
Neutral Equity or zero correlation with fluctuations in
the relevant set (as defined by the hedge
fund) of equity investments.
An investment strategy involving
Long/Short 227 0.89 3.20 purchases of equity expected to increase
Equity in value and short sales of securities
expected to decrease in value.
A multi-faceted investment strategy (i.e.,
Multi-Strategy 169 0.94 2.11 there is no specifically identified fund
style).
Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs)
operate managed futures, which is an
CTA/Managed 131 0.81 5.17 investment fund that takes long and short
positions in futures, options on futures,
and government securities.
An investment strategy where the fund
invests in emerging or developing
Emerging 109 2.21 4.12 regions of the world, and often
Markets characterized by significant political risk
and economic risk.
A fund focused in technology sector
Sector 104 1.35 3.74 specific investments, such as Internet,
semiconductors, hardware, software, etc.
A market neutral investment strategy
Convertible which simultaneously involves the
Crtibe 95 0.58 1.61 purchase of convertible securities and the
Arbitrage short sale of the same issuer's common
stock.
Fixed Income 94 0.72 1.28 An investment strategy which exploits
Arbitrage inefficiencies in bond pricing.
A macro hedge is used to eliminate the
risk of a portfolio of assets, which
Macro 73 0.91 4.64 implies taking a position in a single asset
or multiple assets that offsets the whole
portfolio.
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Table 2 (Continued). Hedge Fund Strategies
Average Average
# Monthly Standard Definition
Fund Strategy Funds Return Deviation of
(%) Returns (%)
Funds that invest in financially distressed
Distressed 67 1.47 2.04 cmaiso p nies.
A minimal risk investment strategy
Merger/Risk where the stocks of two merging
Arbitrage 45 0.47 0.97 companies are simultaneously boughtand sold at a profit. Risk relates to
likelihood and timing of deal approval.
A fund strategy to invest in companies
Event Driven 31 0.97 2.20 with special situations, including
financial distress, mergers and takeovers.
An investment strategy focused on
Value 22 1.04 3.30 companies that are trading on values less
than their intrinsic value.
An investment strategy in which the fund
Short Bias 19 -0.49 3.86 manager takes more short positions than
long positions.
Fixed Income Investments in fixed income securities
(non-arbitrage) 18 0.80 1.45 beyond the realm of fixed incomearbitrage strategies (defined above).
Options 17 0.55 2.44 Funds that focus investments in options.
Strategies
Funds that do not make short saleLong Only 12 0.66 3.61 ivsmnsinvestments.
Finance Sector 11 1.06 1.97 Funds that focus investments in financesector companies.
Small/Micro 10 1.92 4.28 Small investee focus fund investments.
Cap
The U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Regulation D
Regulation D 10 1.58 4.03 governs private placement exemptions
for smaller companies raising debt or
equity capital without registering their
securities with the SEC.
Healthcare 10 0.46 3.80 Funds focused in the health care sector.
Sector
Funds that exploit inefficiency in pricing
Capital from the capital structure of the
Structure 9 0.97 1.27 company, such as by different long and
Arbitrage short positions of debt and equity of the
same company.
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Table 2 (Continued). Hedge Fund Strategies
Average Average
Fund Strategy # Monthly StandardFunds Return Deviation of Definition
(%) Returns (%)
Funds that base their investment
Special 9 1.44 3.55 strategies on special situations, such as
Situations lawsuits, spinouts, bankruptcy, mergers
and tender offers.
Short-term 8 0.50 1.74 Strategic trading for short term capital
Trading gains.
Statistical A trading strategy focused on inefficientArbitrage 8 0.51 1.32 pricing of securities identified from
statistical models.
Other Funds that find inefficiency in the pricing
Arbitrage 8 0.74 1.53 of securities based on a variety of (non-
specified) arbitrage techniques.
Market Timer 5 0.48 1.99 Funds that purchase or sell assets based
on predicted future price movements.
Mortgages 5 0.92 0.79 Funds that focus their investments in the
mortgage sector.
Energy Sector 4 2.18 4.32 Funds that focus investments in energy
sector companies.
Country 3 0.94 4.61 Funds that focus their investments within
Specific a certain country(ies).
Hedge fund strategies in Table 2 are listed according to the frequency
in which they are observed in the combined CISDM and HedgeFund.Net
dataset. Additionally, each fund strategy presented shows the average
monthly return and standard deviation of monthly returns over the period
2003 to 2005. These performance statistics provide a rough guide to risk
and returns associated with different fund strategies.'
While it is not possible to perfectly classify different hedge fund
strategies into different degrees of risk, it is possible to carry out a rather
rough grouping of strategies into different risk profiles and potential
agency problems with an analysis of average monthly returns and average
standard deviation of returns. For example, strategies that involve risk-free
arbitrage would, of course, be of minimal concern for either risk and/or
agency problems.65 The arbitrage strategies indicated in Table 2 include
convertible arbitrage, fixed income arbitrage, merger/risk arbitrage, capital
64. See Burton G. Malkiel & Atanu Saha, Hedge Funds: Risk and Return, 61 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 80, 81 (2005) (providing similar information over the period from 1995 to
2003).
65. In practice, arbitrage will involve an element of risk.
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structure arbitrage, statistical arbitrage and other arbitrage. Generally, the
standard deviation of returns is lower for these arbitrage strategies relative
to other non-arbitrage strategies. We may therefore infer that potential
agency problems are less pronounced for these arbitrage strategies. For
example, fixed-income arbitrage strategies have been described as
analogous to steam rollers that pick up loose change on the 
street.66
For reasons identified in Part III.E. above, strategies for which agency
problems may be more pronounced might include long/short equity, multi-
strategy, CTA/Managed futures, emerging markets, technology sector,
macro, event driven (in some classifications, event driven strategies
encompass distressed securities, Regulation D and high yield low grade
fixed income securities),67 short bias, small/micro cap, special situations,
68
energy sector and country specific. For example, long/short strategies have
been associated with potential agency problems where the fund manager
acts against the interests of its investors, 69 and such strategies have been
associated with massive volatility swings.70 Funds pursuing small/micro
cap strategies and distressed investments also are significantly relevant for
exacerbated agency problems.7
While we do not seek to precisely identify the severity and scope of
agency problems within each fund or class of funds for the purposes of this
paper, we can nevertheless determine whether fund managers pursuing
different strategies, irrelevant of risk, tend to register their funds in
different countries with different sets of regulations identified in Table 1
and discussed in Part IV above. As such, we may pose three alternative
hypotheses about forum shopping:
Hypothesis 1-Race to the Bottom: Hedge fund managers pursuing
riskier strategies and strategies for which potential agency problems are
more pronounced select jurisdictions that have less onerous regulatory
oversight.
Hypothesis 2-Neutrality: The relation between hedge fund strategies
and hedge fund regulation is random.
Hypothesis 3-Alignment of Interests: Hedge funds pursuing risky
66. See, e.g., Fixed-Income Arbitrage, http://www.investopedia.com/terms
/f/fixedincomearbitrage.asp (indicating that large losses are nevertheless possible with fixed
income arbitrage strategies).
67. See Hedge Fund Styles, Lipper HedgeWorld's Education Center,
http://www.hedgeworld.com/education/index.cgi?page=hedge-fund-styles (last visited Apr.
21, 2008) (defining the categories of investment styles used by hedge fund managers).
68. "Event driven" and "special situations" are arguably quite similar but are
nevertheless two separate categories used by HedgeFund.Net and as such are maintained as
separate categories herein.
69. Supra note 40 and accompanying text.
70. Supra note 10 and accompanying text.
71. See supra Part III.E.
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investment strategies select jurisdictions with more onerous regulation.
Below, we assess the empirical validity of these competing
hypotheses. To the extent that we find evidence in support of Hypothesis
1, we may be concerned that international differences in hedge fund
regulation facilitate a race to the bottom where fund managers' interests are
served at the expense of their investors. In the alternative, if the data are
consistent with Hypothesis 2 such that hedge fund strategies are invariant
to international differences in regulation, then we may infer that regulatory
differences provide little, if any, information regarding a fund manager's
intentions with regards to potential agency problems. Finally, if we find
evidence in support of Hypothesis 3, then we may infer that hedge fund
managers perceive regulation to be informative to the funds' investors
because fund managers signal their interest in mitigating potential agency
conflicts associated with fund management by registering in a jurisdiction
with greater regulatory oversight and thereby facilitating fundraising
efforts.
B. Data
The data used in this study comprise 1845 funds. Data were used
from two sources: (1) CISDM, 72 and (2) HedgeFund.Net ("HFN")
DataExport collected by Channel Capital Group Inc.73 Similar data have
been used in prior work.74
The number of fund strategies in each country of fund registration is
indicated in Table 3. There are some patterns that are notable in Table 3.
For example, a greater proportion of the funds pursuing emerging market
strategies are registered in offshore centers such as the Bahamas, Channel
Islands and Cayman Islands.
72. The Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets,
http://cisdm.som.umass.edu/ (last visited May 10, 2008).
73. Hedgefund.net, http://www.hedgefund.net/ (last visited May 10, 2008).
74. See Cumming, supra note 27 (using the data to examine the impact of hedge fund
regulation on fund structure and performance); see also Douglas Cumming, Capital Flows
and Hedge Fund Regulation (Feb. 11, 2008) (York University Schulich School of Business,
Working Paper) (using similar data to analyze the flow-performance relationship of hedge
funds). We do not include fund-of-fund strategies in the dataset used in this paper as such
funds do not have an identifiable strategic focus. Of the fund-of-funds that were excluded
from the data, we observe a majority registered in the U.S.
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Table 3. Number of Hedge Funds Using Different Strategies, by Country of Registration
This table presents the number of hedge fund using different strategies according to the country of
registration. Fund strategies are as defined in Table 2.
Market Long/Short Multi- CTA/Managed Emerging Technology
Neutral Equity Strategy Futures Markets Sector
_______ Equity ______ I
Australia
Austria
Bermuda
Brazil
Bahamas
British
Virgin
Islands
Canada
Switzerland
China
France
Channel
Islands
Hong Kong
Ireland
Isle of Man
Japan
Cayman
Islands
Luxembourg
Mauritius
Netherlands
Netherland
Antilles
New
Zealand
U.K.
U.S.
U.S. Virgin
Islands
II
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
12
0
0
0
0
0
0
76
0
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Table 3 (Continued). Number of Hedge Funds Using Different Strategies, by Country of
Registration
Other
Convertible Fixed Merger/Risk Event Less
Arbitrage Income Macro Distressed Arbitrage Driven Common
Arbitrage Fund
Strategies
Australia 0 0 I 0 0 0 0
Austria 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Bermuda II 2 2 4 1 2 2
Brazil 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Bahamas 0 3 2 0 2 0 1
British
Virgin 2 1 5 3 2 0 2
Islands
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
France 0 2 0 0 1 0 1
Channel 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Islands
Hong Kong 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ireland 3 0 2 0 3 0 0
Isle of Man 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cayman 24 39 20 13 14 0 13
Islands
Luxembourg 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
Mauritius 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
NetherlandNtiles 0 0 0 0 0 0 1Antilles
Newe 0 0 1 0 0 0 0Zealand
U.K. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
U.S. 54 44 38 46 21 29 162
U.S. Virgin 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Islands
While some patterns may already become apparent in Table 3, for the
most part it is necessary and worthwhile to consider multivariate tests to
ascertain patterns in fund registration relative to fund strategies. This
exercise is provided immediately below.
C. Multivariate Empirical Tests
Table 4, Panels A and B provide empirical tests of the propensity of
funds pursuing different strategies to select jurisdictions of registration
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based on their fund strategy. Panel A provides analyses with the use of the
combined CISDM and HFN dataset, while Panel B provides analyses with
the use of the HFN dataset alone.75 We provide eight different regression
models to assess the extent of jurisdiction shopping for minimum
capitalization (Model 1), restrictions on location (Model 2), and different
distribution channels (Models 3 to 8). In the regressions we include as
control variables fund size and age, as well as dummy variables for their
primary location of assets.76
75. A limitation with the HedgeFund.Net dataset is that country of fund registration is
not observable for many of the funds in the source data. The different data vendors also do
not track all of the same fund types. As such, we show regression results below with and
without the HedgeFund.Net dataset in Table 4, Panels A and B to show robustness.
76. Fund size is measured as of 2003, which is an imperfect control variable. We might
measure fund size at the time of first registration, but size at that time would technically be
at or close to zero. We control for fund size considering the possibility that funds expecting
to raise more capital will tend to register in jurisdictions that have larger minimum
capitalization. We do acknowledge that fund size will be in part endogenous to regulations
in different countries; however, we do not have suitable instrumental variables to account
for endogeneity. Excluding the fund size variable in any of the regressions does not
materially impact the variables of interest pertaining to fund strategy and jurisdiction
shopping.
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TABLE 4. REGRESSION ANALYSES OF HEDGE FUND FORUM SHOPPING
PANEL A. COMBINED CISDM AND HFN DATA
Table 4 Panel A presents logit regression analyses of the determinants of forum shopping for
different rules for minimum capitalization, restrictions on location and distribution channels in the
HFN and CISDM datasets. Fund strategy variables are dummy variables equal to one where the
fund's primary strategy is indicated, as per the fund strategies as defined in Table 2. All regression
models in Panel A use dummy variables equal to one for the location of fund assets and a dummy
variable equal to one for the HFN Dataset. Model (la) includes but does not report (for reasons of
space) the coefficient estimates for dummy variables equal to one for statistical arbitrage, value,
Regulation D, fixed income (non-arbitrage), finance sector, long only, energy sector, country
specific, options strategies and other arbitrage (all of these strategy variable estimates were
statistically insignificant in Model Ia); Models (2a)-(8a) do not include any strategy variables not
indicated; more parsimonious specifications were necessary in the logit models (2a)-(8a) due to
collinearity and invariance with respect to the binary dependent variable. Fund size is excluded in
Model (3a) to avoid collinearity problems. Marginal effects are reported and not the standard logit
coefficients in order to highlight economic significance alongside statistical significance. Notations
indicate that the results are statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
(I a) (2a) (3a) (4a)
Minimum Restrictions on the Marketing Marketing via
Capitalization Location of Key via Private Wrappers
Requirements Service Providers Placements
Constant
Hedge Fund
Strategy
Fixed Income
Arbitrage
Merger/Risk
Arbitrage
Convertible
Arbitrage
Multi-Strategy
Event Driven
Short-term
Trading
Market Neutral
Equity
Small/Micro Cap
Short Bias
Long/Short
Equity
380210.296***
70454.269*
47740.678
-3312.301
75605.281
-12643.066
-11039.529
-18918.861
-1872.101
44861.133
-2457.890
0.296***
0.113
0.150
0.078
0.041
0.241
0.008
0.039
-0.102
0.016
-0.038**
-0.036***
-0.003
-0.057***
0.010
0.050
0.024
0.010
0.029*
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TABLE 4. REGRESSION ANALYSES OF HEDGE FUND FORUM SHOPPING
PANEL A (CONTINUED). COMBINED CISDM AND HFN DATA
(Ia) (2a) (3a) (4a)
Minimum Restrictions on the Marketing Marketing via
Capitalization Location of Key via Private Mars
Requirements Service Providers Placements Wrappers
Technology
Sector
Emerging
Markets
Macro
Capital Structure
Arbitrage
CTA/Managed
Futures
Market Timer
Distressed
Securities
Fund
Characteristics
Fund Size
Fund Age
Model
Diagnostics
Number of
Observations
Number of
Observations
with Dependent
Variable =1
Loglikelihood
Function
Adjusted R
2
(Pseudo R2 for
Models 2-8)
F-Statistic (Chi-
squared Statistic
for Models 2-8)
-60895.931
60490.056
145446.365
43149.933
70527.075
-139038.931***
-23136.145
0.00001 *
-488.661***
1845
Not Applicable
-25992.874
0.110
25.38***
-0.082*
0.232**
0.160
0.239*
-0.040
1.06E-10***
-0.0009***
1845
612
-749.307
0.361
845.942***
0.00001
1845
1833
-64.099
0.117
16.572**
-0.001
0.009
-0.001
-5.63E-12
-0.0001
1845
59
-233.041
0.108
56.166***
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TABLE 4. REGRESSION ANALYSES OF HEDGE FUND FORUM SHOPPING
PANEL A (CONTINUED). COMBINED CISDM AND HFN DATA
(5a) (6a) (7a) (8a)
Marketing via Marketing via Marketing via
Marketing via Other Regulated Investment Fund
Banks Financial Distribution
Institution Managers Companies
Constant 0.494*** -0.067*** 0.466*** -0.069***
Hedge Fund
Strategy
Fixed Income 0.051 0.0003 0.071 0.011
Arbitrage
Merger/Risk 0.110 0.108 0.068 0.051
Arbitrage
Convertible 0.063 0.036 -0.010
Arbitrage
Multi-Strategy -0.015 0.002 -0.022 0.016
Event Driven 0.054 0.018
Short-term Trading
Market Neutral -0.015 0.024 -0.063 0.006
Equity
Small/Micro Cap
Short Bias 0.040 -0.011
Long/Short Equity 0.052 0.001 0.025 0.005
Technology Sector -0.129** -0.144***
Emerging Markets 0.082 0.008 0.188* 0.046
Macro 0.117 0.039 0.071 0.032
Capital Structure 0.001
Arbitrage
CTA/Managed 0.172 0.040 0.007
Futures
Market Timer
Distressed -0.120** -0.010 -0.105*
Securities
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TABLE 4. REGRESSION ANALYSES OF HEDGE FUND FORUM SHOPPING
PANEL A (CONTINUED). COMBINED CISDM AND HFN DATA
(5a) (6a) (7a) (8a)
Marketing via Marketing via Marketing via
Marketing via Other Regulated Investment Fund
Banks Financial Ma DistributionInstitution agers Compan es
Fund
Characteristics
Fund Size
Fund Age
Model
Diagnostics
Number of
Observations
Number of
Observations with
Dependent
Variable=l
Loglikelihood
Function
Adjusted R
2
(Pseudo R2 for
Models 2-8)
F-Statistic (Chi-
squared Statistic
for Models 2-8)
2.74E-10***
-0.002***
1845
640
-804.086
0.325
773.709***
L.1OE-12
-0.0002**
1845
73
-286.646
0.067
41.328***
1.37E-10***
-0.0014***
1845
633
-813.738
0.314
745.427***
________________ I I _______________ a a
-5.71E-12
-0.00009
1845
49
-215.631
0.046
21.139
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TABLE 4. REGRESSION ANALYSES OF HEDGE FUND FORUM SHOPPING
PANEL B. CISDM DATA ONLY
Table 4 Panel B presents logit regression analyses of the determinants of forum shopping for different
rules for minimum capitalization, restrictions on location and distribution channels in the CISDM
dataset (excluding the HFN Dataset). Fund strategy variables are dummy variables equal to one
where the fund's primary strategy is indicated, as per the fund strategies as defined in Table 2. All
regression models in Panel B use dummy variables equal to one for the location of fund assets; there
are no other non-reported variables in Table 4 Panel B. Fund size is excluded in Model (3a) to avoid
collinearity problems. Marginal effects are reported and not the standard logit coefficients in order to
highlight economic significance alongside statistical significance. Notations "* " "**," ***"
indicate that the results are statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
(lb) (2b) (3b) (4b)
Minimum Restrictions on the Marketing via Marketing
Capitalization Location of Key Private via
Requirements Service Providers Placements Wrappers
Constant
Hedge Fund
Strategy
Fixed Income
Arbitrage
Merger/Risk
Arbitrage
Convertible
Arbitrage
Multi-Strategy
Market Neutral
Equity
Short Bias
Technology
Sector
Emerging
Markets
Macro
Capital
Structure
Arbitrage
Market Timer
Distressed
Securities
410359.853***
71212.581
25597.807
-16830.136
15931.457
-27607.358
41785.728
-78828.207
54200.932
225534.869
74264.175
-180318.466***
-48694.995
0.540***
0.091
0.112
0.061
-0.007
-0.038
0.009
-0.205
0.211*
0.143
0.248
-0.207
-0.163
0.027
-0.049**
-0.020
-0.004
-0.096***
0.043
0.107
0.015
0.029
0.052
0.080
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TABLE 4. REGRESSION ANALYSES OF HEDGE FUND FORUM SHOPPING
PANEL B (CONTINUED). CISDM DATA ONLY
Fund
Characteristics
Fund Size
Fund Age
Model
Diagnostics
Number of
Observations
Number of
Observations
with Dependent
Variable=l
Loglikelihood
Function
Adjusted R
2
(Pseudo R2 for
Models 2-8)
F-Statistic (Chi-
squared
Statistic for
Models 2-8)
0.00001 **
-515.783***
1127
Not Applicable
-15787.576
0.098
7.08***
1.75E-10"**
-0.001"**
1127
588
-652.245
0.164
255.732***
-2.17E-06
1127
1118
-48.276
0.079
8.318
-2.59E-
12
-1.86E-
05
1127
28
-125.919
0.040
10.388
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TABLE 4. REGRESSION ANALYSES OF HEDGE FUND FORUM SHOPPING
PANEL B (CONTINUED). CISDM DATA ONLY
(5b) (6b) (7b) (8b)
Marketing via Other Marketing via Marketingvia Fund
Marketing via Banks Regulated Financial Investment DitiunInstitution Managers Companies
Constant 0.635 -0.123*** 0.632*** -0.103***
Hedge Fund
Strategy
Fixed Income 0.061 0.093 0.049 0.045
Arbitrage
Merger/Risk 0.108 0.392 0.028 0.115
Arbitrage
Convertible 0.083 0.198 -0.046
Arbitrage
Multi-Strategy -0.037 0.041 -0.085 0.017
Market Neutralequt -0.016 0.103* -0.118 0.032Equity
Short Bias 0.071 -0.034
Technology -0.192* -0.263***
Sector
Emerging 0.115 0.162 0.190* 0.140
Markets
Macro 0.139 0.247 0.059 0.085
Capital
Structure
Arbitrage
Market Timer
Distressed -0.197* -0.226**
Securities
Fund
Characteristics
Fund Size 3.89E-10*** 2.12E-12 1.98E-10*** -4.03E-12
Fund Age -0.002*** -1.86E-04 -0.002*** -3.44E-05
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TABLE 4.REGRESSION ANALYSES OF HEDGE FUND FORUM SHOPPING
PANEL B (CONTINUED). CISDM DATA ONLY
(5b) (6b) (7b) (8b)
Marketing
Marketing via Other Marketing via via Fund
Marketing via Banks Regulated Financial Investment Ditiun
Institution Managers Companies
Model
Diagnostics
Number ofOberon 1127 1127 1127 1127Observations
Number of
ObservationsObevtos590 52 586 32
with Dependent
Variable= I
Loglikelihood -645.732 - 194.927 -661.944 - 137.649
Function
Adjusted R
2
(Pseudo R2 for 0.172 0.075 0.152 0.054
Models 2-8)
F-Statistic (Chi-
squared 268.397*** 31.619"** 236.668*** 15.724
Statistic for
Models 2-8)
Model (la) and (lb) (for Panels A and B, respectively) provide an
ordinary least squares regression of funds registering in jurisdictions with
different minimum capitalization requirements. The data indicate very
weak evidence of any jurisdiction shopping for fund strategies in relation to
minimum capitalization in Models (la) and (lb).77 Model (la) shows that
Fixed Income Arbitrage funds are more likely to select jurisdictions with
larger capital requirements. This is not surprising, as fixed income
arbitrage strategies involve small gains on extremely large transactions. 5
Models (la) and (lb) show Market Timer funds tend to be registered
in jurisdictions with lower minimum capitalization requirements. Some
commentators have noted market timing strategies may involve taking
advantage of differences in market prices for funds that own assets in
different parts of the world and differences in information after markets
77. We also considered Tobit regressions to account for the fact that minimum
capitalization cannot be bounded below by zero. Those regressions showed no significant
relation between fund strategy and minimum capitalization.
78. Supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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close at different points in time around the world, and possibly trading
strategies that are associated with manipulating closing prices.7 9 While the
evidence in Table 1 shows Market Timer funds tend to select jurisdictions
with lower capital requirements, we do note that our data comprise five
funds with a primary market strategy of market timing, and of these four
are registered in the U.S. (where there are no minimum capitalization
requirements for hedge funds) and one in Bermuda. Also, when we
employ alternative estimation methods, we do not find evidence of a
significant relation between market timing and minimum capitalization. 0
It would thus be difficult to conclude from the evidence on a negative
relation between market timing strategies and minimum capitalization in
Table 4 that there is a "race to the bottom" along the lines of Hypothesis 1
outlined above.
Models (2a) and (2b) show some evidence that fund strategies are
related to choice of jurisdiction in terms of restrictions on the location of
key service providers. In particular, the data indicate at the 5% level of
statistical significance that Emerging Markets funds are 23.2% more likely
to register in countries with restrictions on the location of key service
providers (Model (la)). Model (lb) with the subset of CISDM data
similarly only shows at the 10% level of significance that funds pursuing
emerging market strategies are 21.1% more likely to register in countries
with restrictions on the location of key service providers. If we may infer
that emerging market strategies involve potentially more pronounced
agency problems than other strategies, then the fact that these funds select
jurisdictions that restrict location is consistent with Hypothesis 3 described
above in Part V.A.
Consistent with the evidence on emerging markets and restrictions on
location in support of Hypothesis 3, Table 4 Panel A Model (2a) also
shows at the 10% level of statistical significance that funds pursuing
CTA/Managed Futures strategies are 23.9% more likely to register in
countries with restrictions on the location of key service providers. We had
suggested above that CTA/Managed Futures fund strategies involved
potentially greater agency problems, and certainly this strategy is riskier
than other strategies in terms of variance in returns (Table 2). As such, we
would again infer that the data are consistent with Hypothesis 3 insofar as
funds pursuing riskier strategies register in countries with more onerous
regulations. We do note, however, that the positive association between
CTA/Managed Futures strategies is not statistically significant in Model
(2a) with the subset of CISDM data only.
79. See CNNMoney.com, Market Timing: A Weed that Won't Die, Aug. 26, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/26/markets/hedgetiming/index.htm (reporting on a study
that found that market timing strategies are still being used by some funds outside the U.S.).
80. Supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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Model (2a) shows Technology Sector funds pursuing Technology
Sector strategies are 8.2% less likely to register in jurisdictions that restrict
the location of key service providers, and this evidence is significant at the
10% level in Model (2a) (although statistically insignificant in Model (2b)).
There are potentially a variety of reasons why Technology Sector funds
seek fewer location restrictions. One explanation is that these funds exhibit
greater agency problems since information asymmetries are more
pronounced with high-tech investments and, as such, there is greater scope
for fund managers to pursue excessive risk taking strategies. Another
explanation is that these investments require greater geographical
proximity to mitigate information asymmetries faced by the investee
companies and its hedge fund manager and key service providers, and any
restrictions on location may in turn have a negative effect on the hedge
fund value since better performing funds are more geographically
proximate to their investee companies. 81 Overall, therefore, this is not
conclusive evidence in support of Hypothesis 1 outlined above.
It is noteworthy that there are very few significant strategy variable
coefficients in Models (la), (lb), (2a) and (2b). Hence, in terms of
minimum capitalization and restrictions on location, the data tend to offer
greatest support for Hypothesis 2 that fund strategies are largely invariant
to fund regulation. Where coefficients are statistically significant, they
tend to be more consistent with Hypothesis 3 and do not support the race to
the bottom view of Hypothesis 1.
Models (3a) to (8b) analyze forum shopping for different marketing
channels in relation to fund strategies. Funds pursuing fixed income
arbitrage strategies are approximately 3.8% to 4.9% less likely to be
registered in countries that offer distributions via private placements
(Models (3a) and (3b)), and this evidence is statistically significant at the
5% level of significance. Distribution via private placements offers the
potential of risk reduction to the investor since there is more room for
negotiation. For example, ratchet clauses may be used alongside various
covenants to protect the investors, and if necessary, prices may be
discounted in cases of riskier strategies.82 Since fixed income arbitrage is a
comparatively risk free strategy-analogous to steam rollers picking up
loose change on the street-it is not surprising that fixed income arbitrage
is less commonly associated with private placement distribution
81. See, e.g., Joshua D. Coval & Tobias J. Moskowitz, Home Bias at Home: Local
Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios, 54 J. FIN. 2045 (1999) (discussing the bias in
favor of investing close to home); Joshua D. Coval & Tobias J. Moskowitz, The Geography
of Investment: Informed Trading and Asset Prices, 109 J. POL. ECON. 811 (2001) (positing
that investors trade local securities at an information advantage resulting in fund managers
earning substantial returns in local investments).
82. We owe thanks to Professors Ccile Carpentier and Jean-Marc Suret (both of Laval
University) for this comment.
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jurisdictions. Model (3a) also indicates that multi-strategy funds are 3.6%
less likely to be registered in jurisdictions that offer private placements;
however, that evidence is not robust in the subsample of CISDM data in
Table 4 Panel B for Model (3b).
Model (4a) indicates that funds pursuing long/short equity strategies
are 2.9% more likely to be registered in jurisdictions that allow marketing
via wrapper products. This might be suggestive of an exacerbated potential
agency problem insofar as wrappers might facilitate distorted information
distributed to investors with the combination of multiple products.83
However, we note that this evidence is only statistically significant at the
10% level and not statistically significant in Model (4b) with the subsample
of CISDM data only.
Models (5a) and (5b) show funds pursuing Technology Sector
strategies and Distressed Securities funds are less likely to be distributed
via banks. This evidence is statistically significant at the 5% level in
Model (5a) and at the 10% level in Model (5b). In terms of the economic
significance, Technology Sector funds are 12.9% and 19.2% less likely to
be registered in bank distribution jurisdictions in Model (5a) and (5b),
respectively. Distressed Securities funds are 12.0% and 19.7% less likely
to be registered in jurisdictions involving bank distributions in Models (5a)
and (5b), respectively. As agency problems with technology sectors and
distressed securities are more pronounced and as bank distributions tend to
facilitate greater access to retail customers (albeit of typically more inflated
wealth), this evidence supports Hypothesis 3 in that funds are less prone to
register in countries if their strategies are in conflict with their potential
investors' interests.
Similarly, there are no significant coefficients in Model (6a) for other
regulated financial institutions, and Model (6b) shows that the market
neutral equity strategy is the only significant coefficient for other regulated
financial institutions. Market Neutral Equity funds are 10.3% more likely
to register in countries that permit distributions via other regulated financial
institutions. Overall, this is suggestive of the absence of forum shopping
for other regulated financial institution distributions (in support of
Hypothesis 2), and, in the alternative, to the extent there is forum shopping,
it is not in conflict with the interests with potential investors (in support of
Hypothesis 3 and not Hypothesis 1).
Models (7a) and (7b) show funds pursuing emerging markets
strategies are 18.8% Model (7a)-19.0% Model (7b) more likely to register
in jurisdictions that offer marketing via investment managers. Investment
83. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text; see also A Screen for Fraudulent
Return Smoothing, supra note 5, at 6 (finding that misrepresenting strategy accounted for
one of fifty-three SEC hedge fund litigation cases and allowing for more than one offense
per case, misrepresenting strategy involved four of eighty offenses).
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managers are of interest to hedge funds that seek assistance for facilitating
easier access to potential investors that have an interest in the particular
strategy employed by the fund. The investment manager provides services
for regular assessment of strategy and execution, as well as provides
services for risk management reduction and reporting of the hedge fund.
This makes the fund more attractive to its investors.84 In view of the
idiosyncrasies of emerging market hedge fund strategies, it is not surprising
that it is more attractive for Emerging Market funds to seek jurisdictions
that offer investment manager distribution channels so that the investment
manager can help particular fund strategies match with suitable investors.
In net, therefore, we may view this evidence of a positive association
between Emerging Markets funds and distributions via investment
managers as supportive of Hypothesis 3.
Models (7a) and (7b), however, also show that Technology Sector
funds are 14.4% Model (7a) to 26.3% Model (7b) less likely to register in
jurisdictions permitting distributions via investment managers. As well,
Distressed Securities funds are 10.5% Model (7a) to 22.6% Model (7b) less
likely to register in jurisdictions that permit distributions via investment
managers. Fund managers typically require a performance fee of 20% of
fund profits and an exclusivity arrangement.85 It is possible that those
terms are less suitable for hedge funds in the technology sectors and in
distressed securities. As well, it is also possible that the client base of
investment managers is less interested in technology focused funds and
funds focused on distressed securities.
Finally, we note that there are no statistically significant relations
between hedge fund strategies and registrations in jurisdictions that permit
distributions via fund distribution companies. This is supportive of
Hypothesis 2 outlined above.
More generally, we may view that comparative dearth of statistically
significant coefficients in the eight models in Panels A and B of Table 4 as
supportive of Hypothesis 2. In other words, there is not much evidence of
forum shopping in relation to fund strategies. Where we do observe forum
shopping, the evidence is less consistent with the "race to the bottom" view
expressed in Hypothesis 1 and more consistent with the alignment of
interests view in Hypothesis 3.
84. Victor Zimmermann, Hedge Fund Marketing: Pros, Cons and Structuring
Agreements with Third-party Marketers, ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT QUARTERLY, Third
Quarter 2002, 11, available at http://www.cm-p.com/pdf/hedge-fund-marketing.pdf
(discussing the increase in services offered by third party investment managers to attract
investors).
85. Id. at 13-14.
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D. Limitations and Extensions to Empirical Tests
The empirical evidence on forum shopping indicated above is limited
in a few dimensions which are important to acknowledge. First, the
measures used are coarse. We focus on broadly defined fund strategies as
proxies for potential agency problems. More refined data that investigates
the actual activities of the hedge fund manager might provide further
insight into the issue of forum shopping.
86
Second, the data in this paper do not cover the universe of all hedge
funds. Estimates suggest there are up to 10,000 funds worldwide and the
data examined in this paper cover 1845 funds. We did show that the results
are robust with the use of a sample that combines two datasets as well as
with the use of only one of the two datasets. Additional data with more
details on each fund could shed further light on this topic.
Third, the legal dimensions over which we measure forum shopping
are coarse, but broadly defined to enable comparisons across all of the
countries represented in the data. More specific legal differences exist
across the countries in the data, and further legal analyses could seek to
identify factors that lead funds to select particular jurisdictions. For
example, there are tax differences across countries which lead to
differences in jurisdiction selection, particularly for comparing onshore
funds and offshore funds. We note, however, that we do not believe that
these differences distort the measures we study in our empirical tests since
our focus is on legal dimensions that are available to select in both tax
friendly and tax unfriendly jurisdictions. For example, restrictions on
location exist in some offshore centers such as the Cayman Islands but not
in others such as the Channel Islands (Table 1). Hence, while we do not
believe these extraneous legal and tax factors influence our results and
analyses discussed above, we do believe these issues offer avenues for
investigation in future studies.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The debate around hedge fund regulation in part involves the use of
86. To this end, further empirical work might consider differences in forum shopping
among activist hedge funds. For work on hedge fund activism, see Alon Brav, Wei Jiang,
Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, Governance and Firm
Performance, J. FIN. (forthcoming). See also April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial
Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors (NYU Law and
Economics Research Paper No. 06-41, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=913362; FRANK S. PARTNOY &
RANDALL S. THOMAS, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial Innovation, NEW
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CHALLENGES
(Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., Brookings Institution Press 2007).
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innovative investment strategies by hedge funds. On the one hand, these
innovative hedge fund strategies provide various benefits to the financial
systems involved, including providing crucial liquidity to markets, limiting
price distortions and anomalies via arbitrage trading, and taking on risk
across instruments and markets as they are able to change portfolio
composition rather quickly. On the other hand, as active risk takers across
instruments and markets, hedge funds may also exacerbate the risk of
systemic failure, as their strategies involve multiple markets with as yet
untested instrument links.1
7
Opponents of more stringent regulation believe that such beneficial
hedge fund activities are facilitated within a "friendly" environment which
allows freedom and discretion.88 To curtail such freedom may just cause
the players to leave for a friendlier playing field. To allow the players
complete freedom, however, may enable them to run amok. Regulation
and oversight may be too heavy-handed, forcing hedge funds and their
managers to move their operations to more accommodating, less regulated
jurisdictions. Also, as more regulatory oversight would involve taking self-
regulating functions away from hedge fund participants, this may
encourage laxity with regard to investment decisions and risk management.
The question now is not how to regulate the industry, but where to draw the
boundaries for such regulation. If we assume that all hedge fund managers
want complete freedom to do what they do best, then it follows that any
extra regulatory oversight will cause them to forum shop. It also follows
that they might forum shop in a "race to the bottom." We sought to
determine in this paper whether this is the case. We considered whether
forum shopping exists across different hedge funds, applying different
strategies. In view of this argument that hedge funds will forum shop at the
threat of added regulation, we sought to determine how tolerant different
hedge funds are to existing regulation.
We analyzed data from 1845 funds registered in twenty-four
countries. We concentrated on differences in hedge fund regulation across
the twenty-four countries that fall within three primary categories: (1)
minimum capital to operate as a hedge fund, (2) permissible marketing
channels, and (3) restrictions on the location of key service providers. We
considered the different strategies identified and characterized by the
dataset providers, CISDM and HedgeFund.Net, to differentiate types of
hedge funds. We also looked at the average monthly return and standard
deviation of returns to determine the risk of each strategy. The data
indicated scant evidence of hedge fund strategies that are systematically
related to forum shopping towards lower minimum capitalization
87. See supra note 10 for work showing exacerbated systemic risks.
88. See, e.g., Cumming, supra note 27 (showing that hedge fund performance is
hampered by more stringent regulation).
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requirements. We did find some evidence that fund strategies are related to
choice of jurisdiction in terms of restrictions on the location of key service
providers. However, the data showed that forum shopping was in line with
the view that funds pursuing riskier strategies selected jurisdictions that
restricted the location of key service providers. Similarly, with regard to
availing themselves of different marketing channels, the data mostly
indicated that where forum shopping exists, funds are less prone to register
in countries whose strategies are in conflict with the interests of their
potential investors. We may interpret this evidence as supporting the view
that fund regulations are selected relative to a fund strategy in order to
facilitate capital raising.
Overall, we did not find evidence of forum shopping in a "race to the
bottom" due to international differences in hedge fund regulation and fund
strategies. The data for the most part show scant evidence of forum
shopping in relation to fund strategies. Where forum shopping exists, the
evidence shows little support for the race to the bottom view. Instead, it
supports the view that hedge funds select jurisdictions where strategies and
regulations are aligned to suit investor's interests. We note that there have
been no other studies of hedge fund forum shopping to date, and hence Part
V.D. of this paper discussed possible caveats and extensions to the analysis
provided in this paper.
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